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ABSTRACT
Given the choice, users produce passwords reflecting com-
mon strategies and patterns that ease recall but offer uncertain
and often weak security. System-assigned passwords provide
measurable security but suffer from poor memorability. To
address this usability-security tension, we argue that systems
should assign random passwords but also help with memo-
rization and recall. We investigate the feasibility of this ap-
proach with CuedR, a novel cued-recognition authentication
scheme that provides users with multiple cues (visual, verbal,
and spatial) and lets them choose the cues that best fit their
learning process for later recognition of system-assigned key-
words. In our lab study, all 37 of our participants could log in
within three attempts one week after registration (mean login
time: 38.0 seconds). A pilot study on using multiple CuedR
passwords also showed 100% recall within three attempts.
Based on our results, we suggest appropriate applications for
CuedR, such as financial and e-commerce accounts.
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ACM Classification Keywords
K.6.5 Management of Computing and Information Systems:
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INTRODUCTION
In most systems, users are tasked with creating a password
that should be both secure and memorable. Users, however,
typically lack information about what is secure in the face of
modern cracking and attacks tools, as well as how to con-
struct memorable strings, memorize them quickly, and accu-
rately recall them later. Faced with this challenge, users often
create passwords that may seem secure and memorable but
fail on one or both counts. Failure to understand security re-
quirements leads to guessable passwords, while memorability
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issues lead not only to inconvenience, but also to password
reset systems that are often abused by hackers [8, 36].
We argue that the burden of password creation should be
borne by the system, rather than the user. With system-
assigned passwords, the user does not have to guess whether
a password is secure, and the system can ensure that all pass-
words offer the desired level of security. Additionally, while
password reuse could pose a serious security threat [14],
using system-assigned passwords ensures that users do not
reuse a password (or modification thereof) already used on
another account.
Making system-assigned passwords memorable, however,
has proved challenging. Different variants of system-
assigned passwords have been proposed [18, 21, 38, 49], but
none of them provides sufficient memorability. We postulate
that new authentication systems should more effectively make
use of humans’ cognitive strengths and accommodate users
with different learning styles. To this end, we draw upon sev-
eral prominent theories of memory to design CuedR, a novel
authentication scheme that offers visual, verbal, and spatial
cues to help users recognize system-assigned keywords.
Contributions
Memorability. In CuedR, the system assigns users six key-
words, each from a distinct portfolio (e.g., animals, fruits,
or vehicles) of 26 keywords. Both at registration and at lo-
gin, users are provided with an image of the keyword (a vi-
sual cue); a number and a phrase associated with the keyword
(verbal cues); and the fixed position of all of the elements on
the page (spatial cues). Users with different learning styles
can focus on the cues that help them best remember the key-
word. Moreover, the cues facilitate an elaborative encoding
that helps to transfer the keywords from the working memory
to long term memory at registration [4], helping users recog-
nize their keywords when logging in later.
In our single-password study, all 37 participants remembered
their CuedR password after one week of registration. We note
that no other system-assigned password scheme has reported
100% memorability to our knowledge, even schemes offering
only PIN-replacement security levels (e.g. 13 bits of entropy).
Despite high login times (38.0 seconds on average), partici-
pants reported high levels of satisfaction with the scheme and
84% preferred to use it in real life as a replacement to tradi-
tional textual passwords.
ar
X
iv
:1
50
3.
02
31
4v
1 
 [c
s.H
C]
  8
 M
ar 
20
15
Figure 1. A partial screen shot during login. The facts corresponding
to each keyword appear on the left side of the screen. The key is shown
in parenthesis next to each keyword and also in the rightmost column of
the table
Security. By using system-assigned random passwords, the
effective entropy of the passwords is equal to the theoreti-
cal entropy, which is set to 28 bits in our studies. Addition-
ally, CuedR provides variant response during login, which is
known to be an important feature to gain resilience against
observation attacks (e.g., shoulder surfing, keystroke log-
gers) [5].
RELATED WORK
In this section, we give a brief overview of notable textual
and graphical password schemes, in which we highlight why
existing schemes are insufficient.
Textual Password Schemes
User-chosen passwords. Traditional user-chosen textual
passwords are fraught with security problems and are espe-
cially prone to password reuse and predictable patterns [14,
40]. Das et al. [14] found that 43% of users use the identical
password in multiple sites, while 30% of non-identical pass-
words could be cracked in less than 100 attempts. Shay et
al. [40] report that password restriction policies do not neces-
sarily lead to more secure passwords but can adversely affect
memorability.
System-assigned passwords. System-assigned random tex-
tual password schemes are more secure but fail to provide
sufficient memorability, even when natural-language words
are used [38, 49]. Wright et al. [49] compared the usability
of three different system-assigned textual password schemes:
Word Recall, Word Recognition, and Letter Recall. None
of these schemes had sufficient memorability rates. For-
get et al. [20, 21] proposed the Persuasive Text Passwords
(PTP) scheme as a hybrid between user-selected and system-
assigned passwords, in which the user first creates a pass-
word and PTP improves its security by placing randomly-
chosen characters at random positions in the password. Un-
fortunately, the memorability for PTP is just 25% when two
random characters are inserted [20].
Graphical Password Schemes
Graphical password schemes can be divided into three cat-
egories [5], based on the kind of memory leveraged by
the systems: i) Drawmetric (recall-based), ii) Locimet-
ric (cued-recall-based), and iii) Cognometric (recognition-
based). Passfaces [1], a cognometric graphical password
scheme, is commercially available and deployed by a number
of organizations, including banks and government agencies.1
Drawmetric. The user is asked to reproduce a drawing
in this category of graphical passwords. In Draw-a-Secret
(DAS) [25], a user draws on top of a grid, and the pass-
word is represented as the sequence of grid squares. Nali
and Thorpe [28] have shown that users choose predictable
patterns in DAS. BDAS [17] intends to reduce the amount of
symmetry in the user’s drawing by adding background im-
ages, but this may introduce other predictable behaviors such
as targeting similar areas of the images or image-specific pat-
terns [5]. DAS and BDAS have recall rates of no higher than
80%.
Locimetric. The password schemes in this category, includ-
ing Passpoints and Cued Click-Points (CCP), present users
with an image and have users select points on the image
as their password. Dirik et al. [16] developed a model that
can predict 70-80% of users’ click positions in Passpoints.
To address this issue, Chiasson et al. proposed Persuasive
Cued Click-Points (PCCP) [11, 22], in which a randomly-
positioned viewport is shown on top of the image during pass-
word creation, and users select their click-point within this
viewport. The memorability for PCCP was found to be 83-
94%. In a follow-up study, Chiasson et al. [10] found pre-
dictability in users’ click points and indicate that predictabil-
ity is still a security concern for PCCP.
Cognometric. In this recognition-based category of graph-
ical passwords, the user is asked to recognize and identify
their password images from a set of distractor images. Pass-
faces [1] is a commercial cognometric system in which users
select one face among a panel of nine distractor faces and re-
peat this over several panels. Davis et al. [15] have found
that users select predictable faces, biased by race, gender,
and attractiveness of faces. As a result, the commercial Pass-
faces [1] product now assigns a random set of faces instead of
allowing users to choose. However, Everitt et al. [18] show
that users have difficulty in remembering system-assigned
Passfaces. Hlywa et al. [24] found no significant difference
in memorability between cognometric schemes providing ei-
ther face images or object images (entropy: 28 bits), while
the mean login time was 31 seconds for object recognition
and 41 seconds for face recognition.
In sum, schemes with lower risk of predictability also show
lower recall rates. Password managers [12] fail to provide
a suitable solution in this case, as it suffers from usability
(in implementation) and security (e.g., single point of failure)
problems. Indeed, two recent papers extensively examine se-
curity problems in a range of password managers [27, 41].
1http://www.realuser.com/ shows testimonials about
Passfaces from customers.
Figure 2. Illustration of cognitive memory model
Thus, despite a large body of research, it remains a critical
challenge to build an authentication system that offers both
high memorability and guessing resilience.
CuedR: SYSTEM DESIGN
In CuedR, six keywords are randomly assigned to the user
each from a distinct portfolio (e.g., animals, fruits, or ve-
hicles), where each portfolio presents 26 keywords. To aid
memorability, our scheme offers graphical, verbal, and spa-
tial cues corresponding to each keyword. In particular, each
keyword (e.g., “Zebra”) has an image (a picture of a zebra), a
number and a phrase related to the keyword (“2. Each zebra
has a unique pattern of stripes.”), and the position of both the
image and phrase are fixed in both absolute terms and relative
to the other images and phrases (Zebra is at the top between
Cheetah and Elephant). See Figure 1 for a screenshot illus-
trating these features.
Each time a portfolio is loaded, each of the 26 lowercase let-
ters a-z is assigned randomly as a key to one keyword on the
page. The user inputs the key letter corresponding to her key-
word into a single-character password field to move on to the
next portfolio. The key letter changes every time to provide
the variant response property [5]. Schemes with this prop-
erty have been shown to provide higher resilience to shoulder
surfing and simple keystroke loggers than schemes like tradi-
tional textual passwords in which the same letters are entered
at every login [5, 43].
User authentication. At user registration in CuedR, the
system randomly selects six portfolios (without replacement)
and the user is assigned one keyword from each of these port-
folios. The user enters the key corresponding to the assigned
keyword to get forwarded to the next portfolio. In case of a
wrong entry she will immediately be informed about the error
and will need to enter the correct one. During login, the user
recognizes her system-assigned keyword from the portfolio
and enters the key corresponding to that keyword into a small
password field. A successful authentication requires the user
to correctly enter keys for all six of her assigned keywords.
When the user makes a mistake during login, CuedR shows
the user a portfolio that is different from her next assigned
portfolio. A legitimate user can recognize this implicit feed-
back as an indicator that something was wrong and that she
should go back and correct the mistake, while an attacker will
not know which portfolios are correct. Implicit feedback is
thus a desirable feature to enhance usability when passwords
have multiple parts [5].
Password storage. For secure storage of the user’s au-
thentication secret, the six keywords can be concatenated to-
gether with a salt and hashed using a slow hash function like
bcrypt [33] or PBKDF2 [26]. Implicit feedback can be imple-
mented by making the selection of the next portfolio a func-
tion of the current portfolio and the keyword selected, which
is independent of the correctness of the responses. Thus, cor-
rectness only needs to be checked after all keys have been
entered.
THE SCIENCE BEHIND CuedR
In this section, we explain from the perspective of cognitive
psychology how our design choices are set up to provide high
memorability.
Long-Term Memory
We incorporate the scientific understanding of long-term
memory to advance the scheme’s usability properties. Ac-
cording to the cognitive memory model proposed by Atkin-
son and Shiffrin [4], any new information is transferred to
short-term memory (STM) through the sensory organs, where
STM holds the information as memory codes, or mental rep-
resentations of selected parts of the information. The infor-
mation is transferred from STM to long-term memory (LTM),
but only if it can be further processed and encoded. In this re-
spect, an elaborative encoding would take place if the infor-
mation can be associated with something meaningful, such as
cues. This encoding helps people to remember and retrieve
the processed information efficiently over an extended period
of time (see the illustration in Figure 2).
In CuedR, users focus their attention to learn keywords
through associating them with the corresponding cues, which
should help to process and encode the keywords in memory
and store them in the LTM. The cues would assist the user to
recognize the keywords in the future, which should enhance
their memorability.
Memory Retrieval
We designed CuedR to require users to perform a recognition
task. Researchers in psychology have found that recognition
(identifying the correct item among a set of distractors) is eas-
ier than recall (reproducing the item from memory) [46] and
have developed two main theories to explain this: Generate-
recognize theory [3] and Strength theory [47].
Generate-recognize theory [3] speculates that recall is a two-
phase process. In the generate phase, a list of candidate
words is formed by searching long-term memory. Then, in
the recognize phase, the list of words is evaluated to see if
they can be recognized as the sought-out memory. According
to this theory, recognition tasks do not utilize the generation
phase and are thus faster and easier to perform. Strength the-
ory [47] states that although recall and recognition involve the
same memory task, recognition requires a lower threshold of
strength that makes it easier. The point is commonly illus-
trated in examples from everyday life. For example, multiple
choice questions are frequently easier than essay questions
since the correct answer is available for recognition.
Memory Cues
Psychology research [3, 46] has shown that it is difficult to
remember information spontaneously without memory cues,
and this suggests that authentication schemes should provide
users with cues to aid memory retrieval. Encoding specificity
theory [45] postulates that the most effective cues are those
that are present at the time of remembering. In CuedR, cues
are provided during registration, i.e., the learning period, and
also at login.
Why use multiple cues?
In CuedR, the user has five different references (cues) that
she can leverage to learn the keyword: (i) the image, (ii) the
number from 1 to 26, (iii) the phrase or fact associated with
the keyword, (iv) the absolute positions of the keyword, the
image, and the phrase/fact, and (v) the positions of the key-
word, image and phrase/fact relative to the other keywords,
images and phrases. This combination brings together graph-
ical (images), spatial (positions), and verbal (facts, numbers)
information. Thus, a user may focus on just those cues that
she finds most appropriate to her learning process, while the
other cues may provide additional support for memorability.
Graphical cues. Psychology research [29, 31] reveals that
the human brain is better at memorizing graphical informa-
tion as compared to textual information. This is known as
the picture superiority effect, which motivates us to include
graphical cues (images) in our scheme. Several explanations
for this effect have been proposed. The most widely accepted
is dual-coding theory [31], which postulates that in human
memory, images are encoded not only visually and remem-
bered as images, but they are also translated into a verbal
form (as in a description) and remembered semantically. An-
other is the sensory-semantic model [29], which states that
the images are accompanied by more distinct sensory codes
that allow them to be more easily accessed.
Verbal and spatial cues. While images are generally ef-
fective cues, not all users may have a strong visual mem-
ory. Additionally, many graphical password schemes require
good vision and motor skills, which elderly users [34] may
lack. Thus, we provide verbal and spatial cues in addition
to graphical cues to let users leverage their cognitive ability
in memorizing the keywords. Yan et. al. [50] examined the
influence of phrases in increasing the memorability of pass-
words, which inspires us to accommodate a common phrase
or fact for each keyword as a verbal cue.
Having a fixed set of objects in a certain place aids to aug-
ment semantic priming, which refers to recognizing an object
through its relationship with other objects around it [1]. Se-
mantic priming thus eases the recognition task [1]. In CuedR,
the keywords and cues in a portfolio remain same and pre-
sented at a fixed position whenever that portfolio is loaded,
which establishes a relationship between them and reinforces
semantic priming. A recent study [42] also shows that keep-
ing objects in a fixed position improves the usability during
recognition.
CuedR: THROUGH THE LENS OF PASSWORD LITERA-
TURE
Through a comprehensive survey on 25 different graphical
password schemes, Biddle et al. [5] identified seven features
that should be offered by an ideal graphical password system.
The authors [5] state, “We expect tomorrow’s ideal graphical
password systems may have many of the following desirable
characteristics, reflecting lessons learned from proposals to
date.”
In this section, we analyze how CuedR addresses these seven
features and explain our design choices based on the findings
from the literature on passwords.
[1] Theoretical password space meeting the security pol-
icy of the intended domain
Well-known recognition-based schemes, such as Pass-
faces [1] and Story [15], originally provided no more than 13
bits of theoretical entropy. Later, Hlywa et al. [24] conducted
a study on recognition based graphical passwords with 20 bits
of entropy, since 20 bits of entropy with reasonable lockout
rules is considered sufficient to prevent online brute-force at-
tacks [19]. In CuedR, we use more than 20 bits of entropy, in
particular 28 bits, to maintain comparability with prior studies
on system-assigned passwords [49]. During login in CuedR,
a user has to recognize her keyword from a portfolio of 26
distinct keywords. This is required six times, once for each
portfolio. The password space is thus log2(26)
6 ≈ 28 bits.
CuedR can be used with a range of entropy values by varying
either the number of keywords or portfolios.
[2] Avoiding exploitable reductions in security due to user
choice of passwords
Statistical password distributions are often not equiprobable
due to scheme-dependent predictability of user choices [6].
In CuedR, passwords are randomly assigned by the system,
which provides two security benefits. First, the effective pass-
word space in CuedR is same as the theoretical space. Sec-
ond, the system gains user-choice resilience and thus pro-
vides robustness against online guessing attacks that exploit
password reuse, personal information and predictable strate-
gies [14, 40].
[3] At least mild resistance to shoulder surfing and key
logging, through variant response
Variant response refers to varying how the password is en-
tered across different login sessions, which is an impor-
tant feature to offer robustness against shoulder surfing and
keystroke loggers [5].
Shoulder surfing
It is difficult in practice to observe both keyboard and moni-
tor at the same time. Thus, graphical password schemes that
include the variant response feature with keyboard entry pro-
vide higher resilience to shoulder surfing compared to tradi-
tional textual passwords and graphical passwords with mouse
input [43]. In a study by Tari et al. [43], participants play-
ing the role of shoulder surfers were able to gain 73% of
non-dictionary passwords, 26% of dictionary passwords, and
62% of graphical passwords with mouse input, but just 11%
of graphical passwords with variant response.
CuedR offers the variant response feature, where the user
enters a key corresponding to her keyword using the key-
board, and watching only keyboard entries is not sufficient
for a shoulder surfer, as the key associated with each key-
word changes with every login attempt. The entered key is
shown as an asterisk or dot (as with a regular password) to
minimize the risk of shoulder surfing.
Variant response does not protect against an attacker who can
use a video camera to record both the monitor and keystrokes
at the same time, and attackers may gain the user’s creden-
tials when they are assigned during registration. Thus, we
only claim that CuedR provides mild resistance to shoulder
surfing through variant response, which conforms to the de-
sired level of security in this regard [5]. We recommend that
users register in a secure environment (e.g., avoiding public
terminals) to ensure better security against shoulder surfing.
Keystroke and mouse loggers
Keystroke loggers record keyboard input and mouse loggers
capture mouse actions to make the user’s credentials available
for retrieval by remote attackers [5]. Biddle et al. [5] state
that a system provides resilience against keystroke/mouse
loggers when the keyboard/mouse entries for authentication
vary across subsequent login sessions. Thus, the variant re-
sponse feature in CuedR offers better resilience against basic
keystroke loggers compared to a password system where the
same letters are entered during every login session. CuedR
is clearly resilient to mouse loggers, as it does not use mouse
input.
[4] Cues aiding memorability
While different variants of system-assigned passwords failed
to provide satisfactory memorability [20, 21, 38, 49], CuedR
achieves a good memorability through associating each key-
word with a set of cues and letting users choose the appropri-
ate one(s) to their learning process 2. We describe the basis
for the effectiveness of cues in the previous section, and we
report on user perceptions of different cues in the results sec-
tion.
[5] Usability as close as possible to, or better than, textual
passwords
Shay et al. [39] performed a comprehensive study on the
memorability of user-chosen textual passwords following dif-
ferent composition policies, where basic12 was the simplest
form of passwords in which the user had to create a password
of at least 12 characters without any composition require-
ments or dictionary check. Participants reported the least dif-
ficulty to create and remember a basic12 password. After
two days, 86% of participants who wrote down their pass-
word could log in (76% on the first attempt), while 75% of
participants who did not write down their password could log
in (61% on the first attempt). For CuedR, after one week, we
found that 100% of participants could log in (89% on the first
2We note that direct comparison between different studies
should be taken with caution
attempt). So, we see that memorability is better than textual
passwords with moderate security requirements.
Although the login time for CuedR is high compared with
traditional textual passwords, users mostly disagreed with
the notion that the scheme is too time consuming (see Ta-
ble 1). Overall, users reported satisfaction with the usability
of CuedR and 84% preferred to use it in real life as a replace-
ment to traditional textual passwords.
[6] Implicit feedback to legitimate users, when passwords
are multi-part
Implicit feedback instantly notifies a user when she makes a
mistake, instead of showing her an error message at the end
of all entries. Due to its implicit nature, this feedback should
only be recognizable and useful to the legitimate user. An
attacker who does not know about a user’s portfolios must
make all six guesses in CuedR to learn whether he has suc-
ceeded or not. Implicit feedback has already been shown
to have satisfactory user acceptance in a cued-recall based
scheme [13]. To accommodate this feature in CuedR, we
build distinct portfolios of images (i.e., “animals”, “fruits”,
“flowers”, etc.) so that a user can clearly distinguish among
the portfolios at a glance and quickly realize her mistake.
[7] Leveraging pre-existing user-specific knowledge
where possible
Leveraging pre-existing user-specific knowledge, for exam-
ple answering cognitive questions or recognizing personal
images from decoys could make the scheme vulnerable to tar-
geted guessing attacks (e.g., guessing by acquaintances). So,
we did not include this feature in CuedR to ensure security.
Since CuedR offers good memorability, it is not clear if user-
specific knowledge is required, though it could help to reduce
the cognitive burden on users. Exploring ways to securely
leverage user-specific knowledge for authentication could be
an interesting venue for future work.
USER STUDY
We now present the design of our user study to evaluate the
usability and memorability of CuedR. The study procedures
were approved by our university’s Institutional Review Board
(IRB) for human subjects research.
Participants, Apparatus and Environment
For this experiment, we recruited 37 students (25 women,
12 men) through our university’s Psychology Research Pool.
Participants came from diverse backgrounds, including ma-
jors from Nursing, Psychology, Business, Political Science,
Biology, Physical Science, and Social Work. The age of the
participants varied between 17 to 30 with a mean age of 21.
They make regular use of the Internet and websites that re-
quire authentication. Each participant was compensated with
course credit for participation and was aware that her perfor-
mance or feedback in this study would not affect the amount
of compensation.
The lab studies were conducted with one participant at a time
to allow the researchers to observe the user’s interaction with
the system. For this study, we built 18 different portfolios
(e.g., animals, fruits, flowers, and vehicles), and collected the
images (graphical cues) and phrases/facts (verbal cues) from
free online resources.
Procedure
We conducted the experiment in two sessions, each lasting
around 30 minutes. The second session took place one week
after the first one to test memorization of the password. Note
that the one-week delay is larger than the maximum average
interval for a user between her subsequent logins to any of her
important accounts [23]. One week is also a common interval
used in authentication studies (e.g., [17, 30, 49]).
Session 1. After signing a consent form, the participants per-
formed a practice trial with CuedR to compensate for novelty
effect. We did not collect data for this practice trial. At reg-
istration, six portfolios were randomly chosen by the system
and a user was assigned at most one keyword from each port-
folio. Then participants were asked to spend 60 seconds in
completing a mental rotation test (MRT) puzzle shown on the
computer screen, which helps to clear their working mem-
ory [32]. Participants were then given questionnaire that gath-
ered demographic information, and were asked to log into the
same site with CuedR (login 1). They were asked to not write
down their authentication secrets.
Session 2. The participants returned after one week of regis-
tration, and logged into the site using CuedR (login 2). After
they had finished, we conducted an anonymous paper-based
survey. Participants were then compensated and thanked for
their time.
Ecological Validity
Our participants were young and university educated, which
represents a large number of frequent Web users, but may
not generalize to the entire population. They came from di-
verse majors including Nursing, Psychology, Physical Sci-
ence, Business, etc. As the study was performed in a lab set-
ting, we were only able to gather data from 37 participants.
We believe that 37 provides a suitable sample size for a lab
study as compared to the prior studies on password memora-
bility [11, 13, 44, 48].
RESULTS
In this section, we discuss the results of our user study. We
label the login performance of participants in session 1 and
session 2 as login 1 and login 2, respectively. We evaluated
the usability of CuedR via all metrics suggested in the litera-
ture [35]: memorability, login time, number of login attempts,
and user feedback. In addition, we analyzed the impact of
portfolios on login performance and user perceptions on the
effectiveness of different cues. We also discuss the results
of pilot study on the memorability of multiple CuedR pass-
words.
Memorability
We observed a 100% login success rate for CuedR in both lo-
gin 1 and login 2. In login 1, all the participants successfully
recognized the keywords on the first attempt. In login 2, 89%
of participants succeeded on the first attempt to recognize all
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Figure 3. Responses to the question: “How often did the following cues
assist you in recognizing keywords in CuedR?”
six keywords. The other four participants (11%) recognized
five of out of six keywords on the first attempt. Three partic-
ipants corrected their mistake on the second attempt, and the
other participant succeeded on the third attempt.
Registration and Login Time
The mean time for registration was 31.2 seconds (median: 30
seconds, SD: 10.5 seconds). The mean time for successful
login were 25.7 seconds (median: 24.0 seconds, SD: 8.3 sec-
onds) in login 1, and 38.0 seconds (median: 39.0 seconds,
SD: 11.4 seconds) in login 2. A paired-samples t-test reveals
that login time in login 1 was significantly less than that in lo-
gin 2, t(36) = 7.81, p < 0.01. This was expected, as partic-
ipants performed login 1 shortly after learning the keywords.
To note, the reported registration and login time include the
time to download images.
The login time in CuedR is in line with that in prior recogni-
tion based schemes offering 28 bits of entropy [24, 49]. We
note that our results for login time are likely conservative,
since they measure initial use. A recent field study [2] reveals
that login time decreases with the frequent use of a scheme
due to training effects. These findings are in agreement with
our user feedback, where the participants reported that with
practice, they could quickly recognize the keywords (see Ta-
ble 1).
Impact of Portfolios on Usability
In our study, all the participants succeeded to recognize their
keywords irrespective of the type of portfolios in both login
1 and login 2. In login 1, no participant made any mistake in
any portfolio, and thus there was no difference among port-
folios for the number of attempts to succeed. In login 2, four
participants (11%) required multiple attempts to succeed (see
the results for Memorability), where one-way ANOVA test
results show that there was no significant difference among
portfolios in terms of the number of attempts required to
successfully recognize the keywords, F (17, 220) = 1.16,
p = 0.31. In addition, we conducted a post-hoc pairwise
comparison using Tukey’s HSD (Honestly Significant Differ-
ence), which reveals no significant difference between any
pair of portfolios for the number of attempts to succeed.
Our one-way ANOVA test results demonstrate that there
was no significant difference among different portfolios in
terms of the time to learn the keyword during registration,
F (17, 220) = 0.76, p = 0.71, or recognize the keyword ei-
ther in login 1, F (17, 220) = 1.16, p = 0.31, or in login 2,
Table 1. Questionnaire responses for the usability of CuedR. Scores are out of 10. * indicates that scale was reversed. SD: Standard Deviation
Questions Mode Median Mean SD
I could easily sign up with CuedR 10 9.0 9.0 1.3
The login using CuedR was easy 10 10.0 9.5 0.7
Keywords are easy to remember in CuedR 10 10.0 9.4 0.8
*I found CuedR too time-consuming
(i.e., I did not find CuedR too time consuming) 10 7.0 6.4 2.6
With practice, I could quickly enter my password in CuedR 10 10.0 9.8 0.6
I could easily use CuedR every day 10 9.0 8.8 1.3
I could easily use CuedR every week 10 9.0 9.0 1.3
F (17, 220) = 0.59, p = 0.87. In addition, we conducted
a post-hoc pairwise comparison using Tukey’s HSD, which
did not find any significant difference between any pair of
portfolios in either registration time or in login time. These
findings indicate that the usability in recognizing keywords
did not vary significantly across different portfolios used in
our study.
User Perception on the Efficacy of Different Cues
To understand user perception on the importance of different
cues in aiding recognition, we asked them at the end of sec-
ond session, “How often did the following cues assist you in
recognizing keywords in CuedR?” In response, for each cue
they selected one of five options: Never, Rarely, Sometimes,
Often, or Always. Our results show that participants report
using multiple cues to varying degrees to help recognize their
keywords (see Figure 3). In particular, 92% of participants
reported that the images were always or often helpful to rec-
ognize keywords, while 62%, 40%, and 14% of participants,
respectively reported that spatial, phrase, and numerical cues
were always or often helpful in recognizing keywords. The
participants’ diverse choices for cues to aid recognition and
their high login success rate support our anticipation that let-
ting users choose the appropriate cue(s) to their learning pro-
cess aids the memorability for system assigned random pass-
words.
User Feedback on Usability and Applicability
We asked the participants to answer two sets of 10-point
Likert-scale questions (1: strong disagreement, 10: strong
agreement) at the end of the second session. We reversed
some of the questions to avoid bias; the scores marked with
(*) were reversed before calculating the modes, medians, and
means. So, a higher score always indicates a more positive
result for CuedR. To design the questionnaire, we carefully
followed the guidelines provided in the existing password lit-
erature [9, 13, 44], including using nearly identical questions
to those from other studies.
Usability
Participants showed a high degree of satisfaction with the us-
ability (e.g., memorability, ease of login, ease of using either
weekly or daily) of CuedR. Their feedback was also positive
(mode, median, and mean higher than neutral) regarding lo-
gin time, and they indicated that with practice they could log
in quickly using CuedR (see Table 1). In our study, we could
not test the usability of implicit feedback for CuedR, since
most users did not make enough login mistakes to gain expe-
rience with it.
Applicability
At the end of second session, we asked 31 of the participants,3
“Do you want to use CuedR in real life as a replacement to
traditional textual passwords?” 84% responded ‘Yes’, 10%
responded ‘Maybe’, and two participants responded ‘No’,
where both of them mentioned that they would prefer tradi-
tional textual passwords in real life as they did not find any
problems with them. User feedback about the applicability of
CuedR in different online accounts is illustrated in Table 2.
Pilot study: Memorability for Multiple CuedR Passwords
It is common in password research to report a single-
password study in the first article of a new authentication
scheme, which helps to establish performance bounds and
figure out whether multiple-passwords tests are worthwhile
in future research. A recent survey [5] reported that out of
25 graphical password schemes proposed to date, only three
have been evaluated through a multiple-password study, and
none of these study results was reported in the first article.
Since the use of multiple passwords is an important issue for
deployment, however, we conducted a pilot study for multi-
ple passwords, in addition to reporting the detailed results of
a single-password study.
The study procedure was same as that in our single-password
study, except that each participant was assigned three CuedR
Table 2. The applicability of CuedR for different online accounts. Scores
are out of 10.
Online accounts Mode Median Mean SD
Bank 10 8.0 7.4 2.6
E-mail 10 9.0 8.1 2.1
Social Networking 10 9.0 7.7 2.4
University Portal 10 8.0 8.2 1.9
E-commerce 10 9.0 7.8 2.5
3We failed to ask the first six participants.
passwords (18 keywords, in total) instead of one. To adminis-
ter this experiment, we created three different websites outfit-
ted with CuedR and presented the sites to participants as tabs
in an open browser window. Participants were free to select
the order of websites at registration and login, but the tabs
were arranged the same way every time. For this study, we
recruited 11 students (9 men, 2 women) who came from var-
ious majors of our university. We believe that 11 represents a
suitable sample size for a pilot study [22].
In this study, all of the participants were able to log in suc-
cessfully within three attempts in both login 1 (same day of
registration) and in login 2 (one week after registration). In
login 1, nine participants (82%) succeeded on the first attempt
for all three CuedR passwords. One participant (9%) suc-
ceeded to log in using two CuedR passwords on the first at-
tempt, where she recognized 17 keywords on the first attempt
and corrected the lone mistake on the second attempt. An-
other participant succeeded on the first attempt for one CuedR
password, where she successfully recognized 15 keywords on
the first attempt and corrected the mistakes on the second at-
tempt.
In login 2, six participants (55%) succeeded on the first at-
tempt to recognize all 18 keywords. Four participants (36%)
successfully recognized 17 keywords on the first attempt, i.e.,
they succeeded to log in using two CuedR passwords on the
first attempt. For another CuedR password, two (18%) of
these four participants succeeded on the second attempt and
other two participants succeeded on the third attempt. One
participant (9%) successfully recognized 16 keywords on the
first attempt. In particular, she succeeded to log in using one
CuedR password on the first attempt and succeeded on the
second attempt for other two CuedR passwords.
DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss three important aspects of CuedR:
i) impact, ii) acceptance, and iii) application. Here, the term
study refers to our single-password study, unless otherwise
specified. We conclude with a discussion on the scope for
future research on CuedR.
CuedR: The Impact
Existing password systems fail to fully address users’ cog-
nitive limitations or leverage humans’ cognitive strengths.
Thus, despite a large body of research, it still remains a crit-
ical challenge to build an authentication scheme that pro-
vides both guessing resilience and high memorability. CuedR
represents a breakthrough, offering high memorability for
system-assigned random passwords, and shows a promising
research direction to leverage humans’ cognitive abilities for
user authentication.
System-assigned passwords provide higher security against
guessing attacks than user-chosen passwords, but it is diffi-
cult for most people to memorize them [18, 38, 49]. Users
have varying cognitive strengths and abilities, and it is hard
to know in advance what will help a given user to remem-
ber her password. In CuedR, we present a variety of visual,
verbal, and spatial information related to randomly selected
keywords in an organized way and then let users choose the
appropriate cue(s) to their learning process. Further, the cues
can work together. When we asked users to identify the cues
they used, 83.8% of users reported of using multiple cues
often or always. As one participant commented, “The im-
age, phrase and number naturally correspond in my mind, and
make it easy to remember.”
CuedR also shows that the cued-recognition class of pass-
word schemes, a new design point in the field, can be effec-
tive for user authentication. In particular, CuedR addresses
each of the features needed in an effective graphical password
scheme, as identified by Biddle et al. [5] from their compre-
hensive survey on the graphical password literature.
Here we mention a participant’s feedback that particularly
drew our attention: “The multiple cues make it a helpful
password scheme for autistic persons, who find it cognitively
difficult to create secure passwords.” We appreciate such a
thoughtful opinion and note it to be an important issue to be
explored in future work.
CuedR: The Acceptance
In traditional user-chosen passwords, users bear the respon-
sibility of ensuring security for their online account through
a secure password that should be chosen with creativity and
intelligence so that it achieves satisfactory memorability. For
many users, this is a lot of work, and thus in many cases they
compromise with security and create a weak but memorable
password. A recent study [37] reveals that with the advance-
ment of digital technology and widespread use of internet in
recent years, users now better realize the importance of strong
passwords than anytime before, and many of them intend to
create secure passwords but just fail to achieve a good balance
between security and memorability. So, rather than blaming
users for predictable passwords, researchers should improve
how authentication systems address human cognitive abili-
ties.
Participants in our study seem to be convinced with the
security provided by a system-assigned password. In a
post-experiment open-ended question where they were asked
about their opinion of CuedR, most of them reported high sat-
isfaction with its security features.
Since the participants were convinced with the security of
six system-assigned keywords, and could efficiently recog-
nize each keyword in a reasonable time (6.3 seconds, on aver-
age) after a week of registration, they found the overall login
time acceptable and reported satisfaction with the usability of
CuedR (see Table 1). 84% of participants preferred to use
the scheme in real life as a replacement to traditional textual
passwords.
CuedR: The Applications
Although most of the participants reported strong agreement
about using CuedR for all of the given account types (see
Table 2), we must be cautious to recommend its application
since textual passwords have lower login times than CuedR.
Traditional textual passwords are fraught with security prob-
lems that make them less than desirable, especially for high-
security accounts [14]. Ideally, there should be a clear sepa-
ration between the passwords used for low-security websites
and high-security websites [7]. Thus, CuedR can be used
as a standard authentication mechanism for online accounts
with high security requirements and where logins occur rel-
atively infrequently, such as financial (e.g., online banking,
brokerage services) and e-commerce accounts [23]. A study
by Hayashi and Hong [23] finds that users log into financial
and e-commerce sites once a week on average, which is in
agreement with the interval of one week before login 2 in our
study. By using CuedR for high-security accounts, it helps
to build the mental separation with lower security accounts
and avoid attacks based on password reuse and predictable
patterns.
As compared to other cognometric graphical password
schemes that present users with images only, the deployment
of CuedR may require more effort, where separate portfolios
of keywords are built accommodating both graphical and ver-
bal cues. We note that each commercial deployment can use
a small set of portfolios for all of its users. For example, with
10 portfolios, a phisher could correctly guess the first two
portfolios for a user only 1% of the time.
Future Work
Now that lab-study results show promise for CuedR, it would
be an interesting avenue for future work to evaluate the
scheme through a long-term multiple-password study with
larger and more diverse populations, where we would ex-
plore the training effect in reducing login time over more lo-
gin sessions. A recent field study [2] reveals that login time
decreases with the frequent use of a scheme due to training
effects.
In the current interface of CuedR, users have to look at a sep-
arate table to find the phrase/fact related to a keyword (see
Figure 1). In future work, we will test an alternate interface
design to improve login time: The fact related to a keyword
would be shown just below the graphical cue of that keyword,
in which case users should require less time to find a phrase
than finding it from a separate table.
While we have found that combining multiple cues shows
promising results for authentication, we plan to pursue fu-
ture studies to address the following issues: i) The impact
of cues on the login performance of users from different age
groups; ii) The usability of offering various combinations of
cues; iii) The correlations between usability and the elimina-
tion of cue(s) from the interface over login sessions; iv) The
usability of leveraging different cues from mobile devices.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a novel authentication scheme,
CuedR, which helps us to explore the efficacy of combining
graphical, verbal, and spatial cues to improve the memorabil-
ity of system-assigned random passwords. We also discuss
the promise of CuedR in addressing the features of an effec-
tive graphical password scheme [5]. Although the login time
is relatively high, our primary findings indicate high mem-
orability for CuedR, suggesting that cued-recognition would
be an important direction in password research to address the
usability-security tension in authentication.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This material is based upon work supported by the National
Science Foundation under Grant No. CNS-1117866 and CA-
REER Grant No. CNS-0954133. We are thankful to the
anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful suggestions in im-
proving the paper.
REFERENCES
1. Passfaces corporation. The science behind Passfaces.
White paper, http://www.passfaces.com/enterprise/
resources/white_papers.htm.
2. Al-Ameen, M. N., and Wright, M. A comprehensive
study of the GeoPass user authentication scheme. Tech.
rep., arXiv:1408.2852 [cs.HC], 2014.
3. Anderson, J. R., and Bower, G. H. Recognition and
recall processes in free recall. Psychological Review
79(2) (1972).
4. Atinkson, C. R., and Shiffrin, M. R. Human memory: A
proposed system and its control processes. K.W. Spence
and J.T. Spence (eds), Advances in the psychology of
learning and motivation, New York academic press
(1968).
5. Biddle, R., Chiasson, S., and van Oorschot, P. Graphical
passwords: Learning from the first twelve years. ACM
Computing Surveys 44(4) (2012).
6. Bonneau, J. The science of guessing: Analyzing an
anonymized corpus of 70 million passwords. In IEEE
S&P (2012).
7. Bonneau, J., and Preibusch, S. The password thicket:
Technical and market failures in human authentication
on the Web. In WEIS (2010).
8. Bridis, T. Hacker impersonated Palin, stole e-mail
password. Associated Press, Sep. 18 2008.
9. Chiasson, S., Biddle, R., and van Oorschot, P. C. A
second look at the usability of click-based graphical
passwords. In SOUPS (2007).
10. Chiasson, S., Forget, A., Biddle, R., and van Oorschot,
P. User interface design affects security: Patterns in
click-based graphical passwords. International Journal
of Information Security 8(6) (2009).
11. Chiasson, S., Stobert, E., Biddle, R., and van Oorschot,
P. Persuasive cued click-points: design, implementation,
and evaluation of a knowledge- based authentication
mechanism. IEEE TDSC 9 (2012).
12. Chiasson, S., van Oorschot, P. C., and Biddle, R. A
usability study and critique of two password managers.
In USENIX (2006).
13. Chiasson, S., van Oorschot, P. C., and Biddle, R.
Graphical password authentication using cued click
points. In ESORICS (2007).
14. Das, A., Bonneau, J., Caesar, M., Borisov, N., and
Wangz, X. The tangled web of password reuse. In NDSS
(2014).
15. Davis, D., Monrose, F., and Reiter, M. On user choice in
graphical password schemes. In USENIX Security
(2004).
16. Dirik, A. E., Memon, N., and Birget, J.-C. Modeling
user choice in the passpoints graphical password
scheme. In SOUPS (2007).
17. Dunphy, P., and Yan, J. Do background images improve
“Draw a Secret” graphical passwords? In CCS (2007).
18. Everitt, K., Bragin, T., Fogarty, J., and Kohno, T. A
comprehensive study of frequency, interference, and
training of multiple graphical passwords. In CHI (2009).
19. Florencio, D., and Herley, C. Where do security policies
come from? In SOUPS (2010).
20. Forget, A. A World with Many Authentication Schemes.
PhD thesis, Carleton University, 2012.
21. Forget, A., Chiasson, S., van Oorschot, P., and Biddle,
R. Improving text passwords through persuasion. In
SOUPS (2008).
22. Forget, A., Chiasson, S., van Oorschot, P. C., and
Biddle, R. Persuasion for stronger passwords:
Motivation and pilot study. In PT (2008).
23. Hayashi, E., and Hong, J. I. A diary study of password
usage in daily life. In CHI (2011).
24. Hlywa, M., Biddle, R., and Patrick, A. S. Facing the
facts about image type in recognition-based graphical
passwords. In ACSAC (2011).
25. Jermyn, I., Mayer, A., Monrose, F., Reiter, M., and
Rubin, A. The design and analysis of graphical
passwords. In USENIX Security (1999).
26. Kaliski, B. RFC 2898: PKCS #5: Password-based
cryptography specification version 2.0, Sep. 2000.
27. Li, Z., He, W., Akhawe, D., and Song, D. The emperor’s
new password manager: Security analysis of Web-based
password managers. In USENIX Security (Aug. 2014).
28. Nali, D., and Thorpe, J. Analyzing user choice in
graphical passwords. Tech. Rep. TR-04-01, School of
Computer Science, Carleton University, 2004.
29. Nelson, D. L., Reed, V. S., and McEvoy, C. L. Learning
to order pictures and words: A model of sensory and
semantic encoding. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Human Learning and Memory 3(5) (1977).
30. Nicholson, J., Coventry, L., and Briggs, P. Age-related
performance issues for PIN and face-based
authentication systems. In CHI (2013).
31. Paivio, A. Mind and Its Evolution: A Dual Coding
Theoretical Approach. Lawrence Erlbaum: Mahwah,
N.J., 2006.
32. Peters, M. Revised Vandenberg and Kuse mental
rotations tests: Forms MRT-A to MRT-D. Tech. rep.,
Department of Psychology, University of Guelph, 1995.
33. Provos, N., and Mazieres, D. A future-adaptable
password scheme. In USENIX ATC (1999).
34. Renaud, K. A visuo-biometric authentication
mechanism for older users. In British HCI (2005).
35. Schaub, F., Walch, M., Konings, B., and Weber, M.
Exploring the design space of graphical passwords on
smartphones. In SOUPS (2013).
36. Schechter, S., Brush, A. J. B., and Egelman, S. It’s no
secret: Measuring the security and reliability of
authentication via ‘secret’ questions. In IEEE S&P
(2009).
37. Shay, R., Ion, I., Reeder, R. W., and Consolvo, S. “my
religious aunt asked why i was trying to sell her Viagra”:
Experiences with account hijacking. In CHI (2014).
38. Shay, R., Kelley, P. G., Komanduri, S., Mazurek, M. L.,
Ur, B., Vidas, T., Bauer, L., Christin, N., and Cranor,
L. F. Correct horse battery staple: Exploring the
usability of system-assigned passphrases. In SOUPS
(2012).
39. Shay, R., Komanduri, S., Durity, A. L., Huh, P. S.,
Mazurek, M. L., Segreti, S. M., Ur, B., Bauer, L.,
Christin, N., and Cranor, L. F. Can long passwords be
secure and usable? In CHI (2014).
40. Shay, R., Komanduri, S., Kelley, P. G., Leon, P. G.,
Mazurek, M. L., Bauer, L., Christin, N., and Cranor,
L. F. Encountering stronger password requirements:
User attitudes and behaviors. In SOUPS (2010).
41. Silver, D., Jana, S., Boneh, D., Chen, E., and Jackson, C.
Password managers: Attacks and defenses. In USENIX
Security (Aug. 2014).
42. Stobert, E., and Biddle, R. Memory retrieval and
graphical passwords. In SOUPS (2013).
43. Tari, F., Ozok, A., and Holden, S. A comparison of
perceived and real shoulder-surfing risks between
alphanumeric and graphical passwords. In SOUPS
(2006).
44. Thorpe, J., MacRae, B., and Salehi-Abari, A. Usability
and security evaluation of GeoPass: A geographic
location-password scheme. In SOUPS (2013).
45. Tulving, E., and Thompson, D. M. Encoding specificity
and retrieval processes in episodic memory.
Psychological Review 80(5) (1973).
46. Tulving, E., and Watkins, M. Continuity between recall
and recognition. American Journal of Psych 86(4)
(1973).
47. Wickelgren, W. A., and Norman, D. A. Strength models
and serial position in short-term recognition memory.
Journal of Mathematical Psychology 3 (1966).
48. Wiedenbeck, S., Waters, J., Birget, J., Brodskiy, A., and
Memon, N. Authentication using graphical passwords:
Effects of tolerance and image choice. In SOUPS (2005).
49. Wright, N., Patrick, A. S., and Biddle, R. Do you see
your password? Applying recognition to textual
passwords. In SOUPS (2012).
50. Yan, J., Blackwell, A., Anderson, R., and Grant, A.
Password memorability and security: Empirical results.
IEEE Security and Privacy 2 (5) (2004), 25.
